Second Look at Prefetch Files

Monday, March 19, 2012 Posted by Corey Harrell
The one thing I like about sharing is when someone opens your eyes about additional information in an artifact you frequently encounter. Harlan has been posting about prefetch files and the information he shared changed how I look at this artifact. Harlan’s first post Prefetch Analysis, Revisited discussed how the artifact contains strings -such as file names and full paths to modules that were either used or accessed by the executable. He also discussed how the data can not only provide information about what occurred on the system but it could be used in data reduction techniques. One data reduction referenced was searching on the file paths for words such as temp. Harlan’s second post was Prefetch Analysis, Revisited...Again... and he expanded on what information is inside prefetch files. He broke down what was inside a prefetch from one of my test systems where I ran Metasploit against a Java vulnerability. His analysis provided more context to what I found on the system and validated some of my findings by showing Java did in fact access the logs I identified. Needless to say, his two posts opened my files to additional information inside prefetch files. Additional information I didn’t see the first the first time through but now I’m taking a second look to see what I find and to test out how one of Harlan's data reduction techniques would have made things easier for me.

Validating Findings

I did a lot of posts about Java exploit artifacts but Harlan did an outstanding job breaking down what was inside one of those Java prefetch files. I still have images from other exploit artifact testing so I took a look at prefetch files from an Adobe exploit and Windows Help Center exploit. The Internet Explorer prefetch files in both images didn’t contain any references to the attack artifacts but the exploited applications’ prefetch files did.

The CVE-2010-2883 (PDF Cooltype) vulnerability is present in the cooltype.dll affecting certain Adobe Reader and Acrobat versions. My previous analysis identified the following: the system had a vulnerable Adobe reader version, a PDF exploit appeared on the system, the PDF exploit is accessed, and Adobe Reader executed. The strings in the ACRORD32.EXE-3A1F13AE.pf prefetch file helped to validate the attack because it shows that Adobe Reader did in fact access the cooltype.dll as shown below.

\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\PROGRAM FILES\ADOBE\READER 9.0\READER\COOLTYPE.DLL

The prefetch file from the Windows Help Center URL Validation vulnerability system showed something similar to the cooltype.dll exploit. The Seclists Full disclosure author mentioned that Windows Media Player could be used in an attack against the Help Center vulnerability. The strings in the HELPCTR.EXE-3862B6F5.pf prefetch file showed the application did access a Windows Media Player folder during the exploit.

\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\ADMINISTRATOR\LOCAL SETTINGS\APPLICATION DATA\MICROSOFT\MEDIA PLAYER\

Finding Malware Faster

Prefetch files provided more information about the exploit artifacts left on a system. By itself this is valuable enough but another point Harlan mentioned was using the strings inside prefetch files for data reduction. One data reduction technique is to filter on files' paths. To demonstrate the technique and how effective it is at locating malware I ran strings across the prefetch folder in the image from the post Examining IRS Notification Letter SPAM. (note, strings is not the best tool to analyze prefetch files and I’m only using the tool to illustrate how data is reduced) I first ran the following command which resulted in 7,905 lines.

strings.exe –o irs-spam-email\prefetch\*.pf

I wanted to reduce the data by only showing the lines containing the word temp to see if anything launched from a temp folder. To accomplish this I ran grep against the strings output which reduced my data to 84 lines (the grep -w switch matches on whole word and –i ignores case).

strings.exe –o irs-spam-email\prefetch\*.pf | grep –w –i temp

The number of lines went from 7,905 down to 84 which made it fairly easy for me to spot the following interesting lines.

\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\TEMP\TEMPORARY DIRECTORY 1 FOR IRS%20DOCUMENT[1].ZIP\IRS DOCUMENT.EXE

\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\TEMP\PUSK3.EXE

Using one filtering technique enabled me to quickly spot interesting executables in addition to the possibly finding the initial infection vector (a malicious zip file). This information was obtained by running only one command against the files inside a prefetch folder. In hindsight, my original analysis on the prefetch files was fairly limited (executable paths, runcounts, and filenames) but going forward I'll look at this artifact and the information they contain in a different light.
  1. Thanks, Corey. You make diving into the murky world of prefetch files look easy and almost fun! next time I need to do prefetch analysis, I'll be re-reading this post!
    ~Lynn

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